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HOW ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY CHOICES IMPACT CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
As construction oriented public sector agencies have outsourced more and more of their 
construction related activities, they have often suffered from an inability to provide appropriate 
oversight due to degraded capabilities. This had led to calls for these agencies to rebuild 
capabilities across different technical areas. A firm’s boundary choices – make, buy, ally and dual 
modes (make and buy simultaneously) – may impact the ability of a firm to maintain and even 
build new capabilities, and in this paper we seek to investigate the impact that boundary choices 
have upon rebuilding capabilities and the extent to which organizations may make sub-optimal 
choices economically to potentially create opportunities for learning and knowledge sharing. 
Using qualitative data from three project-based public sector organizations managing large 
construction projects, we observed that neither pure make nor buy decisions assisted significantly 
in capability building.  Dual modes provided firms with some opportunities to build capabilities, 
but the most successful decisions seemed to occur in respect of using intermediate governance 
modes such as alliances.  We also observed that the boundary choice was just one dimension of 
the capability building process and suggest organizations require a multi-pronged strategy to 
rebuild capabilities over time. 
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HOW ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARY CHOICES IMPACT CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
Research concerning firms’ vertical boundaries has traditionally looked towards efficiency 
arguments in terms of whether it is more efficient to undertake an activity internally relative to the 
total cost of sourcing the product or service from the market.1 Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
has dominated this research, highlighting the efficiency of markets in the absence of high 
transaction costs driven by factors such as asset specificity, high levels of uncertainty and small 
numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1975; 1985; Macher & Richman, 2008). However, an alternative 
perspective highlights that a firm’s boundaries will be determined by its capabilities – that is, given 
firm heterogeneity, firms will specialize in those activities where they have a comparative 
advantage and attain ‘gains from trade’ by sourcing products or services from the market where 
they do not have a comparative advantage (Argyres, 1996; Jacobides, 2008). 
Thus, while firm capabilities provide an explanation for determining the optimal location 
of a firm’s boundaries, we suggest that this relationship between capabilities and firm boundaries 
is not unidirectional.  That is, the choices a firm makes in terms of what it undertakes internally 
versus what is sourced from the market will, over time, fundamentally impact the development of 
its capabilities. At a basic level, producing a good or service internally (rather than using the 
market) provides an opportunity for firms to learn and build routines as a basis for new capabilities 
(Teece, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). And the use of concurrent sourcing or dual governance 
modes (where a firm buys from the market and simultaneously produces it in-house) along with 
 
1 Governance choices, firm boundaries, vertical scope and vertical architecture are all terms used within the 
literature but relate to the same broad concept – what activities take place within a firm versus what takes place 
external to the firm boundaries. While a number of authors (e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 2002) recognize contractual and 
relational governance approaches to organizing economic activities, our focus in this paper is upon the contractual 
governance approaches to determining firm boundaries.  
Page4 
 
hybrid or network forms of governance (such as alliances or joint ventures) provide opportunities 
for learning and capability building that are not stark ‘all or nothing’ choices in terms of internal 
production versus outsourcing.2 It is the potential for firms to make boundary choice decisions that 
are less than optimal in respect of economic efficiency as a means to build new capabilities (Bridge 
& Tisdell, 2004) that provides an alternative approach to considering capabilities and firm 
boundaries. In this vein, we seek to investigate the choices firms make concerning their vertical 
boundaries (including the trade-offs they make), how these choices are operationalized in terms of 
their day to day activities and the impact these boundary choices have upon the actual development 
of new capabilities. 
We present four possible vertical boundary choices – make, buy, intermediate governance 
modes and dual governance modes.  Existing literature tends to focus upon the rationale for such 
choices rather than the impact that these choices will have upon subsequent capability development 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2005; Makadok & Coff, 2009; Parmiagini & Mitchell, 2009).  In a strategic 
sense, we are primarily interested in how boundary choice decisions are made, along with the 
actual management of these firm boundaries over time, to build or rebuild capabilities that will 
directly impact firm efficiency and competitiveness. 
In respect of our empirical setting, the emergence of New Public Management (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert 2000, English 2005) has seen government agencies pull back their corporate boundaries 
through outsourcing and divestment of core activities (Young, 2007). Agencies that have 
previously been tasked with construction activities as an example, no longer complete any 
construction and instead manage a plethora of contractors. In some cases, the outcome is a 
misalignment between an organisation’s capabilities and the agency’s mandate. At a practical level 
 
2 Makadok and Coff (2009) also distinguish intermediate modes from hybrids in that hybrids are market like in some 
dimensions (ownership, rewards and authority), but hierarchy like in others. 
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the result has been a number of failed projects and select agencies have been tasked with increasing 
their capabilities significantly. The need to (re)build organisational capabilities in the construction 
industry has been clearly identified (Hartmann, Davies & Frederiksen, 2010) whilst maintaining 
high levels of efficiency and thus this paper considers the specific issue of how organizational 
boundary choices has impacted the capability development process in select construction oriented 
public sector agencies. 
 
FIRM BOUNDARIES, CAPABILITIES AND LEARNING 
Building (or rebuilding) capabilities has been a popular topic of research within the capabilities 
and the learning literatures. The focus over time has seemingly become more micro with a stream 
of literature concerning the microfoundations of capabilities (e.g. Teece, 2007; Felin et al., 2012). 
Coupled with such studies is a focus on learning (e.g. Zollo & Winter, 2002; Styhre, Josephson & 
Knauseder, 2004) and the role of the individuals in the decision-making process (e.g. Corner & 
Wu, 2012; Dahlander, O’Mahony & Gann, 2016). 
Whether a firm should undertake an activity or outsource to the market has traditionally 
been determined by the presence of a comparative advantage in respect of a particular activity, 
thus linking firm boundaries and capabilities (Argyres, 1996; Araujo, Dubois & Gadde, 2003). 
However, the relationship is not unidirectional. The location of firm boundaries and the nature of 
these boundaries is a key determinant of whether a firm may engage in the learning and 
establishment of routines that form the basis of new capabilities (Bredillet, Tywoniak & 
Tootoonchy, 2018). It is this ‘reverse’ relationship (ie that boundary choices impact capability 
development) that we investigate. 
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Current explanations for the location of firm vertical boundaries have emerged from a 
variety of perspectives including seminal organizational theory models that focused on the 
coordination of tasks and activities (Katz & Kahn 1966; Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Thompson 
1967), to theories of economic organisation focused on property rights and transaction costs 
(Alchian & Demsetz 1972; Grossman & Hart 1986; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Williamson 1975), 
and strategic theories of resources, capabilities and knowledge (Barney 1995; Foss 2002; Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen 1997). There is also the potential to distinguish between contractual and relational 
governance in terms of where to establish a firm’s vertical scope (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zheng, 
Roehrich & Lewis, 2008; Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Here we focus on contractual governance, 
though invariably in determining whether to engage in an exchange, relational governance would 
be considered.  
Focussing on contractual governance explanations, contemporary research is dominated by 
two broad conversations. The first one is informed by TCE and is primarily concerned with the 
vertical scope of the firm: where to draw organizational boundaries in order to minimise costs at a 
given time point. Whenever the combined costs of internal production and coordination are less 
than the suppliers’ cost of production plus the corresponding transaction costs, firms should 
perform activities in-house (Williamson, 1975, 1985). The second conversation is informed by 
theory concerning capabilities, knowledge and learning, and suggests that due to the heterogeneous 
distribution of capabilities across an industry, the presence of particular capabilities that create the 
basis for a comparative advantage determines firm boundaries. Some authors (e.g. Jacobides & 
Winter, 2005; Argyres & Zenger, 2012) have discussed how transaction costs and capabilities 
interact to determine a firm’s vertical boundaries. In this section we present a review of the salient 
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elements of each of these two research traditions in respect of how boundary choices may directly 
or indirectly impact capability development. 
 These perspectives provide a theoretical rationale for a variety of boundary choices – make, 
buy, ally (intermediate governance modes) and concurrent sourcing (dual governance modes). 
However, each of these boundary choices will then impact the extent to which firms may build (or 
rebuild) capabilities. In the following section we discuss these four boundary choices in terms of 
their impact upon learning and thus the potential to use these in a strategic manner to build 
capabilities over time.  
 
Buy 
TCE suggests that when external suppliers have a comparative cost advantage, provided that there 
is no major threat of holdup, then the firm should buy in the goods or services considered, rather 
than attempt to perform the activity in-house (Williamson, 1975). However, firms that move 
various activities from internal production to external suppliers will see their capabilities in respect 
of these activities wither over time (Collis, 1994). The firm may retain an element of capability, 
but it will weaken significantly in due course as structures change, cultures adapt and critical 
employees leave (Grant, 1996a).  
The potential for gains from trade is likely to limit the efforts a firm makes to build 
capabilities for non-core activities. However, a firm moving into an entirely new activity may still 
find opportunities for learning even if it uses a buy option. There may be some limited knowledge 
leakage (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2005), and whilst its productive capabilities may not change, at a 
minimum, the firm should learn about existing industry standards, technology and appropriate 
pricing of the activity. The need to minimize the risk of cheating encourages firms to learn about 
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various dimensions of the market. Firms pursuing a ‘buy’ strategy will at best know enough to 
engage efficiently with the market, but will not build any significant capabilities. 
 
Make 
Conversely, firms should undertake in-house activities that are considered to be core business, 
where the firm has a comparative advantage, or the transaction costs involved in using the market 
exceed internal production costs (Williamson, 1975). Internal production will allow firms to 
entrench certain routines and develop capabilities over time. Thus the make option provides firms 
with classic learning opportunities akin to the experience curve (Henderson, 1984). Capabilities 
are continually developed within the firm: “know-how is held as trade secrets, and has been 
developed from longer experience than competitors in experimenting with the many combinations 
of parameters of the process” (Argyres, 1996:143). Firms may build new capabilities through 
exploration whereby they actively seek to learn (Brady & Davies, 2004). Hence, there are trade-
off between gains from trade (contracting with a more efficient provider) and a purposeful ‘make’ 
strategy seeking to develop capabilities that are perceived to be desirable. 
 
Intermediate Governance Modes 
The intermediate governance mode or network enables a firm to use a combination of incentives 
to govern a particular transaction with a single economic actor (Makadok & Coff, 2009; 
Williamson, 1991).  These modes refer to a single transaction where the product or service is 
produced via a strategic alliance, whilst dual modes see the options of make and buy applied to 
different transactions, but for the same activity. There is considerable literature concerning how 
alliances can lead to knowledge transfer and learning (Rice et al., 2012; Inkpen, 2005). Beyond 
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any planned knowledge sharing, there is always a degree of knowledge spillovers such that 
interconnected firms will generally experience greater erosion of rents owing to imitation (Lavie, 
2006: 649) and as such, by forming alliances, interconnected firms can gain access to resources 
without paying full acquisition costs.  
Strategic theories focused on knowledge and learning provide clear rationales for the 
existence of alliances as an economically efficient governance mode (Grant, 1996b). As there is 
never a perfect congruence between the activity boundaries of the firm and the knowledge 
boundaries of the firm, opportunities exist for alliances. The suggested implication is increasing 
cooperation with other organizations to engage in activities and access resources, including 
knowledge, outside their own boundaries (Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004). However, strategic 
theories of capabilities and knowledge do not address how the knowledge actually flows between 
organisations and implicitly treat knowledge like other tradeable assets without delving into the 
complexities of transferring knowledge between organisations (Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004). 
 
Dual Governance Modes 
Since Harrigan’s (1984) work on taper integration, it has been recognized that firms do in fact 
use dual governance modes whereby they simultaneously make and buy (concurrent sourcing) 
and make and sell (concurrent exploitation) the same product or service. These dual modes are 
independent and stable choices (as opposed to transitory phenomena) that enable a firm to utilize 
both the market and hierarchy simultaneously.  The existence of dual modes cannot be explained 
using TCE principles and thus alternative explanations rely on alternative mechanisms, including 
learning and capability development (Jacobides & Billiniger, 2006; Krzeminska, Hoetker & 
Mellewigt, 2013; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). 
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Dual modes provide firms with learning opportunities from both their own activities and 
suppliers/buyers. In addition to experience curve effects, the firm is able to build absorptive 
capacity thereby enhancing their capacity to assimilate new knowledge from suppliers (Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998; Jansen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005). Hence, firms will learn which 
activities provide the best opportunities for further gains from specialization. “Concurrent sourcing 
opens the firm to learning arising from the spillovers from related components and different 
production methods of the firm and its suppliers” (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009: 1067). Over time, 
changes in the capability distribution within the industry provide feedback regarding the 
appropriateness of their relationship with suppliers – “firms need to make in order to know … 
[but] firms do not need to make all of their components to know enough to outsource” (Parmigiani 
& Mitchell, 2009: 1067).   
Taken together, different governance modes have been linked to learning and/or capability 
development. This is most overtly seen in the strategic alliance literature where a body of work 
has evolved around ‘learning alliances’ (Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998; Inkpen, 2005; Howard, 
Steensma & Lyles, 2016). Similarly, in considering the make option, there is considerable work 
concerning how firms learn through doing3. Kogut and Zander (1992) look specifically at how 
combinative capabilities may derive from both internal and external learning and the role that the 
make versus buy decision may have upon this learning. Finally, the dual-mode literature is the 
least expansive and the links between this mode and capability building is limited. Nevertheless, 
Parmigiani and Mitchell (2009) highlight the desire for learning within the firm and learning about 
the market (suppliers, standards and prices) to explain why firms may make and buy an input 
product or service simultaneously. 
 
3 See Dodgson (1993) for a review of the early work on learning by doing. 
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Thus, the TCE and the capabilities literature provide a theoretical logic for different vertical 
boundary choices and their management over time. And literature concerning capability building 
and learning considers how this may occur – including issues relating to knowledge spillovers, 
learning by doing and absorptive capacity. This paper extends this line of thinking to explicitly 
consider the following research questions:  
Research Question 1: How do organizations’ boundary choices impact organizational efforts at 
(re-)building capabilities?  
Research Question 2: What other organizational choices impacted efforts to (re-) build 
capabilities? 
 
METHODS, DATA AND CONTEXT 
This research involves three case studies of Australian government organizations.  These 
organizations – the West Australian Department of Housing and Works (DHW), the Main Roads 
Department of Western Australia (MRWA) and the Queensland Department of Main Roads 
(QMR) – are all involved in the building and maintenance of major infrastructure projects such as 
roads, bridges and tunnels in the case of the roads specific departments, and hospitals, schools and 
major government buildings for the ‘works’ department. As outlined in each case study below, 
these organizations have witnessed a significant shift in the location of their boundaries and in two 
cases, major reports have recommended that they need to rebuild relevant capabilities following 
the review of a number of projects.  
The advantages of using these three case studies was that they approximate to something 
akin to a natural experiment and their selection in the study was due to their similarity in respect 
of their activities and the fact that they made different boundary choices. The organizations are all 
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overseeing large scale construction projects and use many of the same contractors. But they also 
demonstrate different boundary choices in action. DHW is dominated by make or buy boundary 
choices; QMR often relied upon dual-modes; whilst MRWA used intermediate governance modes 
in the form of alliances. Faced with similar institutional environments, organizational structures 
(as government departments) and operating in very similar industries, these cases provided an 
opportunity to investigate the role of boundary choices and their impact upon building 
organizational capabilities. 
Data was obtained via 34 interviews (minimum of ten per organization) of approximately 
one hour with key internal and external stakeholders (suppliers/contractors). We committed to 
undertake a minimum of 10 interviews per organization and data saturation was achieved within 
this number. Supplementary data came from secondary data sources including websites, annual 
reports and documentation of procedures. These were used as background information and assisted 
contextualizing the data. To ensure that we had not misinterpreted any of the material, we 
presented detailed reports concerning all of our analysis and our finding to each organization in 
draft form and made some minor adjustments on the basis of this feedback. 
To ensure that we spoke to the most appropriate people, the project sponsors in each 
organization recommended various employees as well as recommending different contractors/ 
suppliers.  This purposive sampling of participants enabled us to gain a variety of perspectives on 
some of the most relevant processes and thus yield rich data for the development of the case 
studies (Cresswell, 2002). Following the initial interviews, we immediately started analyzing 
data and based decisions about what data to collect next on this analysis, thus providing valuable 
clues about missing data and shaping theoretical sampling (Miller, Dingwall & Murphy, 2004). 
We initially used open coding for preliminary categorizing and analyszing the data. This 
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identified key themes that existing across the data in respect of the central research questions. 
Rearranging the data into blocks according to the results of the initial coding process allowed us 
to develop further insights and thus is was through axial coding that additional connections 
between categories were identified.  Constant comparative method underpinned the process 
(Dey, 2004) and finally selective coding was applied whereby we selecting the core concept and 
decided what was required to fill in gaps in categories that required further refinement.  Once no 
further data was required to fill in gaps and the same issues continued to be presented, we 
recognized that we had reached saturation. Final key coding categories can be seen in Tables 1, 2 
and 34.NVivo™ was chosen as the preferred analysis software because of its ability to assist in 
the maintenance of large data sets. Coding was undertaken by one team member and then 
reviewed by another team member to ensure that they ‘made sense’ as a means of ensuring inter-
rater reliability (Charmaz, 1990).  
The resulting cases provide the rich data (Siggelkow, 2007; Burton & Galvin, 2018) 
required to understand the second order complexity of knowledge processes which are 
contextualised in social and cultural experiences (Tywoniak 2007). The choice of three 
comparable, rich case studies gives us interesting insights into the experiences of those in 
organizations that are seeking to rebuild their capabilities through purposeful boundary choices.  
 
CASE STUDIES 
Department of Housing and Works (WA) 
Of the three organizations that formed part of this research, DHW had undergone the most 
significant changes. It had evolved from the original Department of Works in Western Australia 
 
4 The codes shown in the tables are the sub-set that relate to this research paper and a much larger set of codes was 
used across the entire project to meet the needs of the organizations. 
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having been responsible for building much of the major government infrastructure for the better 
part of two centuries. Starting in the 1980s, there was a shift towards greater outsourcing. Different 
parts of the organisation were shifted to other agencies and an increasing number of activities were 
outsourced.  
At present, the DHW primarily manages contracts. Other government departments form 
the client base. For example, when the Department of Education needs a new school or the Health 
Department has funding to build a new hospital, they use DHW to manage the entire process.  
DHW then outsources the vast majority of the activities associated with the design, project 
management and building of the required infrastructure. 
Following some notable problems in some high profile buildings and a change in 
government, DHW implemented a ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy in 2008.  It was recognized that 
the organization was losing a significant portion of its corporate knowledge each year as highly 
skilled long-serving employees retired. Often these employees had come from a technical 
background, the fact that they might have initially entered the organization as an architect or an 
engineer meant that they had a capacity to work with contractors and sort out issues before they 
became problems.  
There are a number of strands to the ‘Review and Rebuild’ strategy. Significant efforts 
have been made to work with other public sector agencies such as the Department of Planning and 
Infrastructure and MRWA. This includes formal processes such as the creation of a central Office 
of Strategic Projects to assist with major projects (such as a new teaching hospital) and more 
informal processes such as networking events for relevant project managers.  
There has been little in the way of changing the boundaries of the organization with the 
vast majority of activities directly relating to designing and building completed by contractors. 
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There are some limited efforts to bring some of the preliminary or complementary work back in-
house.  For example, in respect of meeting certain sustainability targets, DHW is doing a small 
amount of the work and using consultants on more specialized projects. This is also being tried in 
other preliminary design related activities – “Sustainability is one area we are putting in some 
effort, but there’s many other facets of design that we’re not able to put the same effort of resources 
in and so there are large gaps.  Heritage has been variable, but it’s less well resourced, also it’s 
a specialised area.  Then there’s everything, remediation, pollution, are all related to sites and … 
there is no expertise”. 
There have been significant attempts to learn from contractors as part of the ‘Review and 
Rebuild’ strategy such as the introduction of much more detailed project reviews. These however, 
have been fairly unsuccessful at helping to build organizational knowledge.  First, little real effort 
was put into the reviews with people customising them as they see fit – “Because you allow that 
customisation, I guess you then get different firms, and different project managers, who have a 
different perspective on what they want, and what they expect”. Secondly, the pace of work is such 
that there is little time for reflection and subsequent action – “People don’t do a job and then start 
the next one... they’ve always got six, or eight, or ten on the run at once”. In addition, employees 
tend to work individually on projects so they have little opportunity to learn from other projects 
unless a formal evaluation review is shared amongst a larger group – “each project manager is 
basically his own little island and his or her team”. 
The other key reason why so little knowledge is assimilated by DHW from their various 
contracting efforts is the actual nature of the contracts used. The principal determinant for selecting 
a contractor is the price – “So there’s a lot of pressure on us, generally speaking, to bottom trawl, 
to have the cheapest price”. Contractors submit tenders that include virtually no margin and work 
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on the (commonly correct) assumption that there will be some change in scope or specifications 
for which they will be able to invoice separately and this is where they will make their margin. 
The result is that there is simply no organizational slack such that contractors can spend time 
working with DHW in a way that will help them rebuild some capabilities.   
The boundary choices of outsourcing much of the work and trying to learn from some 
contractors has not been successful in the main. And even when activities are undertaken 
internally, they tend to not result in organization-wide capability development as the learning tends 
to stop at the individual involved. Key findings can be seen below in Table 1. 
 
< < - - -  Insert Table 1 around here  - - > > 
 
Queensland Department of Main Roads (QMR) 
Of all the states in Australia, Queensland has been the least aggressive in pursuing out-sourcing 
amongst its various government agencies. They have been slow to follow this global trend and as 
a result are envied by agencies across many other states due to their ability to still take a lead role 
in a variety of standards or process related discussions with industry bodies.   
Nevertheless, there has been a significant shift in the design of the organization with the 
construction component being corporatized (ie they were structured to operate in a manner similar 
to a commercial firm and to pay a dividend to the government).  This shift started in the 1980’s 
when QMR began to initiate a change in their structure to split the department into two sections: 
Main Roads (QMR) and RoadTek. QMR was responsible for much of the design and recording of 
standards and specifications which they maintain through a comprehensive set of manuals. 
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RoadTek was responsible for the physical building of the projects and contract themselves back to 
QMR. Employees were allocated a division in which to work.  
Even with this arrangement, over the last two decades more and more work has been 
outsourced to private contractors. Respondents indicated that it used to be the case that 80 percent 
of project work was done through RoakTek and 20 percent outsourced. The situation is now 
revered with 80 percent of work being outsourced. 
The knowledge that is created through projects and specific research undertaken internally 
is shared and eventually forms the basis for enhanced capabilities through a number of 
mechanisms. There are formal communities of practice which have been very successful, smaller 
technical forums and an annual technology transfer forum held in Brisbane annually for 
participants from all the regions. There are also structures and systems in place such as always 
trying to puts pairs of people or groups of three on a project, structured mentoring programs and 
the creation of a culture where people are very happy to share information. 
There is less success with building capabilities in respect of outsourced work.  With respect 
to big projects there are formal systems in place – “... there are formal meetings with the 
representatives; it’s all documented in minutes”.  The problem is that this tends not to be 
internalized – “...here’s the explicit knowledge, and here’s the tacit knowledge and then how do 
we bring it into, so it becomes tacit knowledge, you know, for others and passing it on.  So we’ve 
got to be thinking about how do we pass on information, not plonking it somewhere, and that’s 
what we do – we put it somewhere and then expect people to go and find it for themselves”.   
There are some exceptions to this where due to the relationships in place there are 
meaningful learnings emerging out of the work done by the private contractors – “I was at a 
learnings workshop a couple of weeks ago for a very large project and all of the presenters, or 
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bar one or two, were private industry people, and they had an attitude of sharing that even with 
their competitors.  They’re not sharing financial commercial in confidence information ... it 
[could] be just a simple technical construction issue or a design issue or it can be something much 
broader”. 
The choice to make and buy certain activities simultaneously has had limited success in 
terms of building capabilities. There were select examples where QMR sought to explicitly learn 
from contractors and incorporate this knowledge into their own similar activities. However, in the 
main, using outside contractors was undertaken to achieve economic efficiencies and the 
continuance of internal operations whilst the majority of the activity occurred externally was more 
likely to see QMR assume the position of an ‘informed buyer’. The key findings for QMR are 
shown below in Table 2. 
 
< < - - -  Insert Table 2 around here  - - > > 
 
Main Roads Western Australia (MRWA) 
Up until the 1980s MRWA had total control over the design and construction of roads. Over time 
more work was outsourced such that by the 1990s as much as 60 percent of work was handled by 
contractors. A further push to outsourcing work was made under the State Government’s economic 
rationalist reform agenda – resulting in significant staff reductions. In 2001 a Ministerial report 
recognized that this has severely compromised MRWA’s capacity to operate and recommended 
that Main Roads rebuild about 25 percent of its in-house design capacity, so that it was not just an 
‘informed buyer’, but a partner in the State road industry. This paved the way for a move towards 
relationship contracting and particularly alliancing. A new Commissioner was hired who brought 
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with him a wealth of contracting experience and knowledge about relationship contracting and in 
a little under three years from the influential report, MRWA entered its first (rather prescriptive) 
alliance contract.  
Before covering the alliance contacts used, it is worth noting that the majority of work done 
by MRWA is still smaller scale projects that are either completed in-house in respect of 
establishing standards or are outsourced and a project manager oversees them from the perspective 
of MRWA. Similar to the previous two cases, the extent to which there is any learning from the 
contractor very much depends upon the relationship that exists. 
In comparison, alliance contracts – which apply to the largest of contracts – seem to be 
considerably more successful. The awarding of alliance contracts are based on multiple criteria 
including the reputation of the alliance partners rather than being based entirely upon cost. Even 
the final cost is often not determined until after the contract has been signed and preliminary design 
work is completed (though there is always an accepted formula or system for determining the 
eventual cost that is agreed to in advance). In essence, a key driver for MRWA is to build the best 
possible roads for the community and they seek alliance partners who can bring innovation to each 
project (Edmonds, 2007). While alliances are primarily risk/reward-sharing arrangements, they 
afford the opportunity for both public and private partners to engage in projects larger than any 
one entity would be able to undertake on their own. Thus alliances provide capacity building 
potential for all individuals and organizations involved – something that is not inherent in 
conventional contracting arrangements.  
At the start of each project, an independent alliance facilitator works with the alliance 
management team to determine goals, including a commitment that everyone will exit the alliance 
with enhanced knowledge and skills. This process involves establishing explicit non-cost key 
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performance indicators (such as training), which are measured and rewarded by the client as part 
of the contract. Thus there is a clearly articulated learning agenda.  
Alliance partners agree that the biggest challenge in establishing an alliance partnership is 
bringing people from different organisations together to think as one. Another key issue is that 
alliance contractors may require the use of key personal for many years and employees are not 
replaced in MRWA while they are working away from the department on the alliance contract. 
However, involvement in an alliance contract is an invaluable source of knowledge for the 
employee and the department – “The learning has been huge… and importantly we are 
documenting everything we do and feeding that back into Main Roads”.   
When alliance members return to the parent organisation they take with them invaluable 
knowledge not only about the practice of constructing a particular road, but also about the way 
that alliance partners think and the collaborative, problem solving processes involved to achieve 
the outcome. Documenting the alliance experience embellishes knowledge which flows back to 
the organisation through other conduits like formal reporting, designs and the Technical Advisory 
Group. People entering new alliances have described the knowledge gleaned from the documented 
processes of previous alliances as invaluable. Many employees see the exchange of ideas, the 
flexibility to resolve differences of opinion and innovate in the open environment of the alliance 
as a very healthy way of building knowledge. This is particularly effective because feedback loops 
are being developed and this new knowledge challenges existing, traditional thinking within the 
parent organization. Employees involved with developing and implementing design standards see 
great benefits flowing back to their team.  
MRWA employees have a range of opinions about the effectiveness of alliancing and views 
differ depending on whether or not people have been involved in an alliance. One Main Roads 
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alliance said “I didn’t think that the knowledge and skills transfer would work the way people told 
me it would, but I have learnt a huge amount about how contractors work and I have taught the 
contractors about how Main Roads works and there has been an enormous transfer of knowledge”. 
The key findings for MRWA are shown below in Table 3. 
 
< < - - -  Insert Table 3 around here  - - > > 
 
DISCUSSION 
In considering whether organizations make strategic vertical boundary choices to rebuild 
capabilities and whether these vertical boundary choices involve trading-off short-term 
efficiencies for learning opportunities we considered four boundary choices. The three case studies 
discussed do not present pure and discrete cases of different boundary choices, however, many of 
the decisions were unique and provide a very useful starting point for better understanding the 
choices organizations make in respect of their boundaries, how they operationalize these choices 
and the impact they have upon the organization. A summary of these choices and their impact 
upon capability building is shown in Table 4. 
 
< < - - -  Insert Table 4 around here  - - > > 
 
Boundary Choices and Capability Building 
In respect of Research Question 1 – how organizations’ boundary choices impact efforts to (re-
)build capabilities, it was clear that the four different boundary choices presented very different 
outcomes. Not unexpectedly, the option to buy a product or service did not provide an opportunity 
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to learn from contractors. As the knowledge on the part of the contractor was embedded in the 
organization, being largely tacit in nature and entrenched within a dominant culture, it was 
inevitably difficult to transfer without a comprehensive appreciation of the context of the 
knowledge (Soo et al., 2002). And on the recipient side of the equation, the lack of relevant internal 
knowledge (Davies & Brady, 2016) limited absorptive capacity (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998) or 
receptivity (Hamel, 1991) led to an inability to understand what the other party was doing, as well 
as not being able to understand the process leading to the other party’s knowledge development. 
Thus without existing knowledge and routines relating to a specific activity, it was challenging to 
acquire knowledge and build new capabilities – as was seen very clearly in the case of DHW. 
In comparison, the make strategy did provide opportunities for the development of 
capabilities though learning by doing whereby explicit knowledge becomes internalised by staff 
and adds to their tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). DHW attempted to bring  additional 
activities in-house such as sustainability, heritage and environmental reporting. However, without 
an existing knowledge base or relationships with contractors in these areas, there were limited 
opportunities to learn other than through trial and error. In essence, expanding the firm boundaries 
and bringing an activity into the organization does not suddenly (or even slowly) guarantee new 
capabilities (Wohlgemuth & Wenzel, 2016). Instead, we observed inefficiencies (relative to what 
was achieved when the activity was outsourced) and slow progress in respect of capability 
building. 
It was not obvious as to why QMR followed a dual mode strategy in respect of their 
boundary management.  The most likely explanations from the earlier discussion center on 
information asymmetries (Heide, 2003), performance uncertainty given the complex nature of the 
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products or services (Novak & Eppinger, 2001), and opportunities to learn (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 
2009).  
Where dual-modes were employed, the decision to buy seemed to be based on efficiency 
and budget constraints, whilst the decision to simultaneously make provided a deep understanding, 
of the activity as a basis for managing the outsourcing contracts efficiently. However, there were 
also clear examples of QMR choosing to undertake an activity internally so that they could learn 
and build this learning into their operations when more and more of this particular activity was 
being outsourced. Thus the logic concerning why an organization might take a potentially 
economic inefficient position by utilizing a make and buy choice for the same product or service 
in terms of learning and building absorptive capacity (Jansen et al., 2005; Parmiagiani & Mitchell, 
2009) did hold in this case.   
Intermediate governance modes were most obvious in the form of alliance contracting as 
seen primarily in the case of MRWA. These were used for the largest projects and could be 
understood in terms of managing risk. By providing incentives for a range of outcomes that varied 
between the hard-to-motivate and the easy-to-motivate tasks, they limited opportunism through 
quasi-hierarchical authority and simultaneously delivered a degree of autonomy beyond that 
experienced with a hierarchy (Dyer & Singh, 2008; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). 
These alliance contracts came at significant cost in that they were never established purely 
on the basis of efficiency and they purposefully incorporated a range of key performance indicators 
around knowledge transfer and learning. Some employees physically moved out of MRWA 
facilities for extended periods and the financial uncertainty associated with these projects was 
significant. Yet the results in terms of (re-)building capabilities were very positive. The physical 
co-location and joint activities provided a platform for tacit and explicit knowledge transfer 
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(Nonaka, 1994). Undertaking activities jointly presented the contextualization for effective 
learning that was not available through other boundary choices. 
 
Organization Operations Choices and Capability Building 
In respect of the second research question – what other organizational choices impacted efforts to 
(re-)build capabilities – a range of management initiatives enhanced or restricted the effectiveness 
of capability building efforts. Management support for developing capabilities was seen in the 
creation of structures, processes and support systems for learning. Such commitment manifested 
itself in a variety of ways including, the establishment of mentoring programs, internal training 
and development programs, communities of practice and informal knowledge transfer networks 
(Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017). One distinguishing factor between QMR’s and DHW’s attempt 
to rebuild capabilities was the desire and clarity around the strategy for rebuilding. Hamel (1991) 
suggests that knowledge acquisition requires intent on the part of management in the form of a 
learning agenda and support by senior management. “Without clear corporate goals for 
competence building, and a deep appreciation for the critical contribution of core competence 
leadership to long-term competitiveness, individual businesses appeared unlikely to devote 
resource to the task of learning” (Hamel 1991: 92). QMR’s extensive communities of practice, 
informal systems to bring people together and formalized communications both within the 
organization as well as with suppliers emphasizes their intent. 
In addition, social processes, like trust, were critical as contractual governance is unable to 
sufficiently safeguard against exchange hazards associated with information exchange to get 
people to commit to fully engaging in capability development activities (Zheng et al., 2008; 
Geneste & Galvin, 2015). As a number of respondents indicated, knowledge is power and thus, 
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you do not willingly give it up if you do not trust how you will be valued in the future: the 
contractual governance processes tried to create boundaries for relational governance such as 
formalizing the expectations around learning and collaboration. 
Considering those factors that restricted capability building, the lack of slack resources that 
allow for staff to engage in learning and work with other parties was critical.  Thus in the case of 
DHW, the focus on price meant that contactors did not have the capacity to work with the project 
manager from the government agency. It also created an adversarial relationship that went against 
the need to create trust in the relationship to allow for knowledge transfer. Finally, as previously 
alluded to, absorptive capacity and co-location were critical.  If organizations “need to make in 
order to know” (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009: 1067) then simply using the market to provide 
certain products and services will never provide the basis for this absorptive capacity, or the 
socialization opportunities for inter-organizational knowledge sharing and learning. This was a 
key reason why the MRWA alliance contracts were so successful in helping to rebuild capabilities. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper investigates the impact of organizational boundary choices on the capability 
development process in organizations. Our findings and discussion reveal two contributions: first, 
we build on existing literature to show how boundary choices impact the capability development 
(RQ1); second, our research identifies various management activities and decisions that enhance 
or restrict the relationship between boundary choices and capability development (RQ2). 
This paper presents different boundary choices (make, buy, intermediate governance 
modes and dual governance modes) and considers how such choices may potentially impact the 
(re-)building of firm capabilities. Outside of the make option, all other governance modes provide 
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particular pathways to capability development and we sought to investigate how these were used 
and their effectiveness across three construction oriented public sector organizations. For 
managers, what was perhaps most revealing were the results for the intermediate governance 
modes and the dual modes. In the case of dual modes, the decision to use the market for some 
production of a service or activity has been proffered as potential source of learning. “When a firm 
concurrently sources, learning will be enhanced, since it gains both the deep tacit knowledge of 
internal production and the broader, more diverse understanding from external supply 
relationships” (Parmigiani, 2007: 292). For the purposes of building capabilities it seemed that the 
‘deep tacit knowledge’ was key and the use of the market was done more for efficiency reasons 
and resource limitations (ie government dictated staff limitations) than for any logic concerning 
learning. In comparison, the choice of intermediate governance modes was undertaken specifically 
for the purposes of learning and the manner by which opportunism was limited through alliance 
contracts was something of a by-product of pursuing explicit learning goals. It was only through 
intermediate governance choices that new capabilities were able to be developed that were not 
generated internally. Nevertheless, the strategic use of these specific boundary choices were only 
a partial solution to rebuilding capabilities. Therefore we show how different strategic boundary 
choices impact capability building, providing an answer to RQ1. 
While boundary decisions were shown to be important determinants in the capability 
building process, this was only half of the story.  From a management perspective it is this other 
half of the process concerning how the boundaries were actually managed that represents 
opportunities to make significant changes within firms. Considering dimensions such as intent, 
embeddedness, receptivity and internalization, it was clear that the same boundary choices may 
have different outcomes in-line with variations across these dimensions.  Interestingly, the 
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boundary choice decisions are made by senior managers. However, the boundary management 
processes are actioned largely at middle management levels. Examples of communities of practice 
were seen in two organizations, yet these were not initially supported by top management and in 
one case, they survived their first years by their champions pursuing their agenda under a quality 
banner. Overall, firms make trade-offs in respect of economically efficient boundary choices and 
choices that may provide opportunities for capability development. The success of firms following 
these sub-optimal boundary choices were, however, significantly tempered by the boundary 
management processes utilized by the organizations (thereby addressing RQ2). 
This research suffers from the obvious limitations of single case studies for the different 
boundary choices, a unique setting in time in terms of the desire by all of the selected organizations 
to rebuild their capabilities that may have tempered the extent to which boundary choices may be 
used strategically. And the cases themselves were not as similar to each other as initially hoped, 
given our preference to create a natural experiment. However, we would suggest that future 
research efforts should not focus upon overcoming these limitations, but rather look more deeply 
at contextual factors and the micro-processes concerning how firms build capabilities through 
specific boundary choices over time. For example, how do firms move away from pure make or 
buy boundary choices in terms of the types of activities (core versus peripheral; product versus 
service, simple versus complex) that use dual or hybrid governance modes? How do these initial 
changes create trajectories in terms of subsequent changes in respect of boundary choices? And 
are these dual and hybrid governance modes temporary aberrations that may be utilized to rebuild 
capabilities before either bring the product or service back entirely in-house, or now that they are 
an informed buyer, go back to using the market? Strategically varying am organization’s boundary 
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choices may be part of the process for rebuilding firm capabilities, but delving deeper in when, 
where and how would be a useful extension to this research agenda.  
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Theme Meaning Textual Data 
Learning (individual) People work very 
independently which limits 
learning 
“So for a lot of people … what they know is 
through their own experiences and they tend to 
keep it to themselves today because the project 
management environment doesn’t promote that 
sort of informal interaction”. 
“People worked on the basis that knowledge is 
power to I’ll keep the knowledge to myself”. 
Learning 
(organization) 
Learning is often restricted to 
individual initiatives and not 
systematic organizational 
efforts 
“… there’s no interchange of knowledge [from 
contractors]… they’re selected, they basically do 
the work, we basically pay the bills and we 
generally only pay lip service to [enhance] 
capacity, to have any professional knowledge of 
what’s going on”. 
Boundary choices Lack of clarity about the scope 
of activities to be undertaken 
by the organization versus 
what should be outsourced. 
“We haven’t found the appropriate managerial 
control of a Public Works agency … Where is the 
border line? … I’ve advocated for a greater 
degree of expertise centrally”. 
“[It’s challenging], rebuilding capacity in an 
environment where essentially lip service is paid 
to rebuilding a public service entity”. 
Outsourcing/internal 
operations 
There is some attempt to learn 
via outsourcing 
“… we’re having to build an understanding of 
sustainability … so we send them over this 
checklist, you’ve got to check that the work is 
sustainable and as we up the ante we’ll have to 
understand more about various sustainability 
tolls and evaluation techniques. We are 
struggling with that”. 
Conflicting interests Generally engaging the lowest 
priced contractor limits both 
quality and future learning. 
“With the builders, it tends to be adversarial. We 
try not to make it that way, but it tends to be … 
“Here’s a very detailed set of documents, down 
to the last bolt”. This is for a fixed price and 
we’ve got a very tight contractor we manage you 
with”. 
Relationships with 
contractors 
Contractors engage with DHW 
in an adversarial manner. 
“These firms have got a culture of, we are always 
right, we are the professionals, we can’t be 
wrong … It’s never, ever their fault”. 
Review processes There are no effective systems 
and processes to learn when 
contractors are used. 
“So post-contract form of analysis? Very rarely 
happens. Very, very rarely happens”.  
“I’ve got a file …every email with a change, I’ve 
stuck in there, but the changes are often verbal. 
Once it’s sorted, I’ll either write it down or I’ll 
stick a copy of the email into a file. It’s not very 
methodical”. 
 
Table 1: Key findings – Department of Housing and Works 
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Theme Meaning Textual Data 
Learning (individual) Learning occurs when faced 
with new situations and is 
reinforced through repetition 
“sometimes you have to experience a few 
problems to actually learn and improve … it’s an 
individual thing” 
Learning 
(organization) 
Sharing knowledge and 
codifying this knowledge is 
highly challenging 
“Our design people created a code of practice … 
we’d pass onto every consultant [we worked 
with]. There might be certain things that don’t 
work, certain materials that do work in certain 
situations … and it needs a lot of effort to receive 
the information on how to do things better and 
actually change the system quickly and 
efficiently”. 
Boundary choices Learning from contractors was 
a high priority 
“With contractors it is a little bit different … But 
the Department has a strong emphasis on 
partnering and relationship management”. 
“We’re trying to do a little bit more of getting 
input and involvement … from users than what 
we have in the past”. 
Outsourcing/internal 
operations 
Learning from contractors is 
possible when the same 
activity is undertaken 
internally. 
“… but we don’t do it [design] routinely and the 
amount of work we’ve been doing has been 
decreasing and so the idea … is to get some 
hands on experience on the application of the 
standards [to design] so that we can feed that 
back into our standards”. 
Conflicting interests Sharing knowledge with other 
parties varies according to the 
activity. 
“… that construction arm is commercial guys, so 
they’re less willing to share … They play those 
games and so that’s actually hindering people”. 
Relationships with 
contractors 
Learning from the activities of 
organizations with whom you 
outsource requires long-term 
investment 
“We’re trying to work more cooperatively with 
them [contractors] … they became very 
antagonistic. … They’re finally realizing that 
they’re in it for the long haul”. 
Review processes Active engagement 
throughout the process is 
critical to build capabilities 
“We hire consultants and contractors … Our 
motivations were that we could learn … 
Knowledge is fed back into standards and 
specifications manuals”. 
 
Table 2: Key findings – Queensland Main Roads 
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Theme Meaning Textual Data 
Learning (individual) Building knowledge across 
Main Roads and external 
organizations is important. 
“I have organized an annual [training course] 
which we run for project managers within Main 
Roads … This year we will open it up to allow 
local government”. 
Learning 
(organization) 
A key focus of the alliance 
partnerships is knowledge 
building and sharing. 
“Knowledge enhancement/ generation is a key 
part of the alliance. During the workshops we 
developed a strategic framework which included 
a commitment that everyone would come out of 
the alliance with enhanced skills”. 
Boundary choice Alliances are used for large 
projects and co-location is a 
critical part of the alliance. 
“The best part of the alliance is the proximity of 
the constructor and [Main Roads employees] … 
so they can bounce ideas off each other and the 
constructor is actually part of the design team as 
it unfolds”. 
Outsourcing/internal 
operations 
Working with partner 
organizations builds 
knowledge and networks. 
“The sharing of knowledge is a two way street 
and no one is bleeding off anyone else. I have 
enhanced my knowledge of design and 
geotechnical issues, I know that the Main Roads 
guys have a better understanding of contracting 
issues”. 
Conflicting interests Consultative processes in the 
alliance limited conflict. 
“Different organizations have a different culture, 
behaviors, work ethic and time management … 
“[with problems] we would discuss them on the 
spot and in the vast majority of cases, the 
problem didn’t come back again – we had a 
solution to it”. 
Relationship with 
contractors 
Relationships were 
collaborative, but different 
cultures created challenges 
“Because of different cultures it has been a battle 
from day one to build a team and have had to 
constantly work on our team culture and 
development. We have tried to get people out of 
their huddles and focussed on creating a new 
team with a unique identity”. 
Review processes The process of learning is not 
just from the alliance, but also 
concerns how well the alliance 
performs. 
“We are documenting everything we do … We 
are documenting the contracting award process, 
all other processes and lessons learnt at each 
critical milestone, ie once we finalized the 
alliances agreement, preliminary design … There 
is a very fluid interface between the alliance and 
Main Roads WA – but not intrusive. 
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 Dept Housing & Works Dept Housing & Works Queensland Main Roads Main Roads W.A. 
Boundary Choice Buy Make Dual-modes Alliance 
Formal effort to 
build capabilities 
Introduced the ‘Review 
and Rebuild’ strategy. 
Introduced the ‘Review 
and Rebuild’ strategy. 
The internal party – Road 
Tek – continued to 
undertake activities even 
though most work was 
outsourced. 
Staff (including CEO) were 
brought in on the basis of 
their experience with 
alliance contracting. 
Logic for 
boundary choice 
Efficiency. DHW lacked 
internal capabilities in 
areas where it used 
markets. 
Efficiency across limited 
areas of core business. 
There was some effort to 
learn by bringing activities 
‘in-house’. 
The bulk of the work (80%) 
was outsourced for 
efficiency reasons, but 
internal production 
occurred to allow for 
learning. 
Need to build new 
capabilities – even at the 
expense of efficiency. 
Boundary choice 
changes 
Each year more activities 
have consistently been 
outsourced as staff retired 
and capabilities were lost. 
Some work was brought 
in-house in the areas of 
sustainability etc. This did 
not prove to be successful. 
Internal production went 
from 80% to 20% across 
relevant activities. Efforts 
were made to work with 
contractors and learn from 
them. 
Large projects were 
undertaken using alliance 
contracting. Staff moved 
between MRWA and the 
contractor. 
Factors restricting 
capability 
rebuilding 
Contracts were awarded 
on the basis of lowest cost 
and thus contractors did 
not have the margin to 
work with DHW to assist 
the capability building 
process. Internal 
knowledge (absorptive 
capacity) was limited. 
Internal knowledge in new 
areas was limited and 
without this absorptive 
capacity, it was difficult to 
build capabilities. 
Many ‘hands-on activities’ 
were entirely outsourced 
limiting opportunities for 
new staff to work on-site. 
Staff involved in the 
alliance benefited, but 
embedding this knowledge 
as a basis for new 
capabilities was 
challenging. 
Success in 
boundary choice 
assisting to 
rebuild 
capabilities 
Virtually no learning 
occurred. Learning was 
extremely limited in these 
arms’ length transactions. 
There was some limited 
learning. It was more 
around retaining rather 
rebuilding capabilities. 
Learning did occur and 
allowed the organization 
to be an ‘informed buyer 
and to work with suppliers. 
Significant learning 
occurred and MRWA 
became a contributor to 
knowledge across the 
industry. 
 
Table 4: Key findings for each organization 
